Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 22

Issue 5

Article 10

12-1-2005

Reply to Sean Carroll
Peter vanInwagen

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
vanInwagen, Peter (2005) "Reply to Sean Carroll," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers: Vol. 22 : Iss. 5 , Article 10.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200522524
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol22/iss5/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

REPLY TO SEAN CARROLL
Peter van Inwagen

Sean Carroll argues that we should endorse atheism since there are no good
reasons for affirming the more complex thesis of theism over the less complex thesis of materialism. However, this argument relies on an epistemological minimalism we should reject.

There have been both atheists and theists for a long time. These are the
words of one Peter of Cornwall, writing in about the year 1200.
There are many people who do not believe that God exists . . . . They
consider that the universe has always been as it is now and is ruled
by chance rather than by Providence.1

In Peter’s time, people, both atheists and theists, had a very different picture of the physical universe (the mundus, they would have called it) from
the one we have today. The mundus, they believed, was bounded by a big
sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars. No official size was ascribed to this
sphere (Ptolemy had pointed out that whatever its size was, it was so
much larger than the earth that the earth could be treated as a dimensionless point in astronomical calculations), but one piece of medieval sciencefiction gives it a diameter close to what we now know is the diameter of
the orbit of Mars. The earth — Peter’s contemporaries had the size of the
earth about right — was at the center of this thing, and between the earth
and the stars were invisible rotating spheres in which the moon and the
sun and the planets were embedded.
Since that time we’ve discovered a lot about the mundus, a lot about the
totality of the distribution of matter and radiation in spacetime, and our
discoveries show that what the medievals believed about it was mostly
wrong. It is many orders of magnitude larger than they thought, it has no
geometrical center, it is of vast but finite age (in Peter’s time, Christians
thought it was about 5000 years old and atheists thought it had an eternal
past), and it has not always been as it is now: it has developed into its present state from earlier, very different states and it will be very different in
the far future from the way it is now. We know a lot, too, about what we
now call the laws of physics, and we know that the most general features
of the world are not a mere jumble of unrelated facts but are very tightly
constrained by these laws.
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So we’ve learned a lot. Is any of what we’ve learned relevant to the old
debate between the atheists and the theists? Does, for example, Sean
Carroll know anything of relevance to the debate that was not known to
Aethelred the Atheist in AD 1200? In my view, the answer is that some of
what we’ve learned is of great importance for this debate, and none of it is
of really fundamental importance. Here’s an example of something we
now know that is of great but not really fundamental importance for the
debate. We know that there was no such time as twenty billion years
before now — just as there is no such place as twenty thousand miles to the
north of here. And the atheists of Peter’s time believed (at least what they
believed logically implied) that there was such a time as twenty billion
years before now and that the mundus was at that time, in its large-scale
features, much as it is now. But this doesn’t show that the medieval atheists were fundamentally wrong; it shows only that their picture of the
mundus was defective. A more subtle picture of the relation of the physical
world to time than theirs has turned out to be necessary, but the more subtle picture is, or various more subtle pictures are, consistent with atheism.
And the same is true the other way round, so to speak. A lot of what theists
believed about the mundus and its contents has turned out to be wrong:
that the earth is at its center, for example, that God had created it in essentially its present form about four thousand years before the birth of Christ,
that a living organism can exist only if a rational agent has imposed the
form definitive of its species on a particular parcel of matter . . . . But none
of these theses was essential to theism, and theists, a few radical and intellectually marginalized Protestants apart, gave them up with less fuss than
atheists have generally displayed in giving up the idea of a physical universe that has an eternal, uniform past.
And why not? After all, if God exists he can create an object to any set of
specifications that doesn’t involve a contradiction. Given, then, that the current — or any future — scientific specification of the features of the physical
universe doesn’t involve a contradiction, God can create an object that meets
that specification. It says so on the label. And hence God, if he exists, is able
to make an object that has just the features that today’s science tells us, or
that any future science might tell us, the physical universe has (unless, of
course, there’s a hidden contradiction in that combination of features). Would
he? Well, leaving the general topic of pain and suffering to one side — the
problem of evil is a worthy topic, but its not our topic today, for the plain
reason that the existence of suffering is not a scientific discovery — I don’t
see why not. (I must say, I don’t see even the faintest hint of plausibility in
the suggestion that a God who could make any possible universe would
have made a smaller universe than this one or a universe in which there was
only one family of elementary particles.) I don’t see any feature of the physical universe that looks like some sort of clue that it is uncreated.
How shall I argue for this thesis? Well, let me tell a parable. In the far
future, our descendants create a virtual reality, a world simulated in a computer of (to us) miraculous storage capacity and computational speed. The
Creators, so to call them, put people into their virtual world (for in my parable, the Strong AI Thesis is true) — self-aware, rational beings: “the
Inhabitants.” The Inhabitants and their environment are not the product of
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a patchwork simulation of human neural activity and the interactions of
physical objects involving tens of thousands of arbitrary rules to enable the
program to simulate the surface features of physical objects in the world of
human experience. Rather, the Creators simulate a world at the level of its
constituent elementary particles. In one sense, the computer does nothing
but simulate the interactions of individual elementary particles, which take
place in accordance with strict rules embedded in the program: the laws of
nature of the virtual world. Everything else supervenes on that, as philosophers like to say, including an evolutionary process by which the
Inhabitants have come to be. By a clever choice of laws and boundary conditions, the Creators see to it that the Inhabitants have the intellectual and
physical (physical from the point of view of the Inhabitants) resources to
understand their world scientifically. And the Inhabitants succeed in doing
this. They discover the laws and boundary conditions the Creators have
built into their world and they are able to tell the story of its workings and
origin and development and their own evolution in a way as intellectually
satisfying to them as our scientific story of the workings and origin and
development of the physical world and our own evolution is to us.2
It should be clear that none of the Inhabitants’ scientific investigations
are going to reveal to the them that the Creators exist or that they, the
Inhabitants, are the denizens of a virtual reality. But suppose that, for one
reason or another, some of them do believe these things — the Virtualists,
they’re called. Could a cosmologist of the virtual world write an interesting
paper about why so few cosmologists are Virtualists? What would the
arguments of such a paper be? I think they would, unsurprisingly, be
much like Sean Carroll’s arguments, premised on a kind of epistemological
minimalism. That is, on a principle something like this: Don’t believe in
anything not present to the senses unless it’s required by the most compact
and elegant and effective theories of the physical world; visible and tangible things aside, believe only in what figures in the best scientific theories
(unless the best scientific theories reveal themselves as in some significant
way incomplete, in which case it may be permissible to believe in certain
things that don’t figure in them but whose postulation somehow mitigates
that incompleteness).
Would the arguments of the virtual cosmologist be right? (A parenthetical question: Even if those arguments are right, wouldn’t they support
agnosticism about the truth of Virtualism rather assent to the falsity of
Virtualism? And, by a parallel argument, doesn’t epistemological minimalism support agnosticism rather than atheism?) Have the Creators, in creating the Inhabitants, created people who could believe in them, the
Creators, only on pain of irrationality, or at least on pain of having beliefs
whose foundations could not survive epistemological analysis? Is there
necessarily something objectionable about the position of the Virtualists?
I don’t think these questions can be answered, for I, the author of the parable, have said too little about the epistemological condition of the Inhabitants
for them to have answers. I haven’t, for example, said anything about why
some of the Inhabitants are Virtualists. I suggest further reflection on the
question whether there are any possible features the Creators could build into
their virtual world in virtue of which it would be proper for some at least of
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the Inhabitants to believe in them, the Creators, and to believe this rationally,
with the proper sort of epistemic grounding. Would the Creators, if they
wished some of the Inhabitants rationally to believe in them, have to include
miracles in their world (which of course they could easily enough do)? Or, in
setting up the laws and initial conditions of the virtual world, would they
have to make these aspects of the world in some way “incomplete”?
I will say no more about these questions. But I do want to raise a question
about epistemological minimalism. That thesis would seem to be no more
plausible than this very slightly more general thesis: Don’t accept any proposition not subject to straightforward factual verification unless that proposition is endorsed by the sciences or is necessary for explaining some global
fact that the sciences leave mysterious. However plausible this thesis may
seem when it is considered in the abstract, no one I know of conforms to it.
Even in the sciences, we quite often find two scientists who have access to
exactly the same relevant data and who nevertheless disagree — about, say,
whether Neanderthal genes are still present in modern humanity, or
whether so-called gamma-ray bursts originate inside our galaxy or at cosmic
distances, or whether anything is going to come of superstring theory. And
don’t get me started on our philosophical and political beliefs; it’s certainly
obvious that almost everyone has political beliefs that are neither verifiable
matters of fact nor endorsed by the best scientific theories. It’s an interesting
question whether there’s any important epistemological difference between
an atheist and theist (on the one hand) and (on the other) two equally expert
and informed astronomers in, say, 1994, one of whom thought that gammaray bursts occurred inside our galaxy and the other of whom thought they
occurred at cosmic distances. Whatever differences there may be between
the two pairs of disputants, at least one person in each pair is in violation of
the principle of epistemological minimalism. Think of matters this way: it
can hardly be true that the proposition ‘Gamma-ray bursts are local phenomena’ and the proposition ‘Gamma-ray bursts are not local phenomena’
were both endorsed by the science of astronomy in 1994; logic therefore dictates that at least one of our scientists was not conforming to the requirements of epistemological minimalism, and common sense whispers that it
was almost certainly both of them who were. (As Thomas Kuhn said,
“Whenever you get two people interpreting the same data in different ways,
that’s metaphysics.”3) So, whether epistemological minimalism is philosophically defensible or not, few if any of us are consistent epistemological minimalists, epistemological minimalists with respect to every subject-matter. I
ask only that no one say that it’s all right to fail to adhere to epistemological
minimalism in science or politics or philosophy, but that one must be a strict
epistemological minimalist in theological matters.
NOTES

The University of Notre Dame

1. In an unpublished manuscript, quoted in Robert Bartlett, England under
the Norman and Angevin Kings, 1075-1225. The quotation was re-quoted in a
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review of the book by John Gillingham, in the Times Literary Supplement, 5 May
2000, p. 26. The reviewer also quoted these words from the book: “. . . simple
materialism and disbelief in the afterlife were probably widespread, although
they leave little trace in sources written by clerics and monks.” No page citations were given in the review.
2. The parable is modeled on a simulation imagined in Greg Egan’s novel,
Permutation City (New York: HarperPrism, 1994).
3. Kuhn said this in an interview with the science writer John Horgan. See
John Horgan, The End of Science (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), p. 44.

